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OHAPTER I 
INTRODUOTION 
. 
. 9 .,;., 
In various works of St. Thomas there are what appear to 
be conflicting statements about the relative superiority of 
different forms of rule. In the De6egimine ~rincipum, for 
example, it is said: "More useful ••• is the rule of one man 
than the rule of many." 1 In the Summa theologica we read: 
"There is likewise a form of government which is a mixture of 
these, and this is the best." 2 In the Oommentary ~ the 
Politics of Aristotle alone there are the following state-
ments: "Monarchy is the best form of government and the one 
most in accord with right reason." 3 "It is manifest that 
the aristocratic state is better than a monarchy." ~ "The ".. 
multitude is stronger, better and richer than any particular 
groups within it. For the multitude includes those groups 
and others as well. 10 group of a few does this." 5 The 
---------------
1 De regimine principum, I, 2. Here, as in all other in-
stanoes of translation occurring in the text, the En~ish 
version is the present authorts responsibility, unless 
other indication is made. 
2 Summa theologica, Iallae, q. 95, a.4, c. 
3 PolitiCS, IV, 1. 
4- ~., III, 14. 
5 Ibid., III, 11. 
1 
texts oould be multiplied, 6 but the apparent diso~panoies 
are well known. 7 
2 
The oPPosition is most 01ear1y to be seen in the apparent 
insistenoe of the ~ regimine on monarohy and the often oited 
. 
passage of the Summa theo10gioa tn~whioh it is maintained 
"that the best ordering of powers was that established by the 
Old Law." g It is not implied, of fourse, that St. Thomas 
was guilty of oontradiotion or inoonsistenoy, but the point 
is to disoover the preoise framework whioh holds these dif-
ferent propositions together. 
Several proposals have been offered. For Gilson, the 
teaohing of the Summa on the mixed regime is seemingly taken 
as a olarifioation by St. Thomas of what he meant by monar-
ohy. 9 But there seem diffiou1ties in Gilson's interpreta-
tion 10 of the passage in Iallae, q.105, a.l, whioh is th~ 
text oommonly oited in this matter. These difficulties will 
---------------
6 Of., for example, the arguments for monarohy in De reg., 
I, 2; S.T., la, q.103~ a.3, 0.; Oontra Genti1es,-rV, 76; 
for government by an elite, in~. III, 14; for the mixed 
form, the famous passage, S.T., Iallae, q.105, a.1. 
7 Of. Father Garrigou-LagrangeTs formula of reoonoi1iation: 
"Konarohia est regimen imperfeotorum ••• , demooratia est 
regimen perfeotorum," in the prefaoe to the Frenoh ~rans­
lation of De reg imine prinoipum (Du ~ouvernement royal, 
ed. de 1a Gazette Franoaise, Paris, 926, p.xvl) together 
with Gilson's observation that Unrest soutenable que du 
oate des sujets" (E.Gi1son, Le Thomisme, ed. 5, Paris, 
Vrin, 1945, p.459, n.1). 
g S.!., Iallae, q.105, a.1, o. 
9 ire Gilson,. ~.oit., pp.456 et seq. 
10 Ibid., p.~57, of., n.3. 
, 
be presented later in this thesis. Here we wish merely to 
note that if the difficulties prove to be real, they would 
. obstruct the collation Professor Gilson suggests. 11 
3 
Father M.-D. Chenu would, in effect, resolve the antinomy 
• 47 between the De regimine.and the SWriina by suppressing one of 
the members, namely, the De regimine. That would seem to be 
the result of his proposal that the.De regimine be treated as 
"a moral and pedagogical treatise for a prince's use, not an 
organic work of political theory.' 12 What merit we find in 
Father Chenuts suggestion will be indicated further along, 13 
in our discussion of the sources on which this thesis is based. 
The most thorough treatment of the problem is that of 
Marcel Demongeot. 14-· He has indicated the great complexity 
of the problem and the necessity of a multitude of distinctions 
-..... ~----- ... -----
11 Of. the similar proposed 'solution" of the difficulty in 
Antonio Burri, Le teorie politiche di san Tommaso e il 
moderno diritto"publico (Roma, 1994-}T ·Cos1 s. Tommaso 
riduce in ultima analisi Ie forme di governo alltuno e 
non uno, che come direbbe il Cousin sono gli elementi 
supremi di ogni teoria metafisica; ed applicata tale 
teoria aIle forme di governo, ne segue come osserva il 
Taparelli (Dissert. II, cap. IX, nota LXVI), ohe la mon-
arohia e la poliarohia differisoono essentialmente in oio, 
che nella prima l'unit~ sociale nasce dall'uno natur~le, 
nelltaltra dalltuno artificiale 0 morale." lP755). Along 
similar lines, though more superficially, argues Wilhelm 
Muller, 'Der Staat in seinen Beziehungen zur sittliches 
Ordnung bei Thomas von Aquin,' Baumker's Beitrage, XIX 
(1916). 
12 Bulletin thomiste, 1929, p.19g. 
13 See p. / 
14 Marcel Demongeot, Le meilleur regime politique selon saint 
Thomas, Paris, Blot, 1929. 
4 
for its proper understanding. 15 The differences of.'possible 
points of view in approaching the problem, which he seeks to 
olassify with the aid of "formal logio," 16 are presented in 
the following diagram: 17 
I. The P,oint 
of View of 
the Philo-
sopher 
(Speoula-
tive with 
regard to 
end and 
general) 
II.The Point 
of View of 
the Legis-
lator (Purely 
practioal 
and parti-
oular) 
----------------
l)Purely speou-1 
lative and Best government absolutely 
abstraot 
2)Speoulative ) 
with regard 
to mode 
3)Praotioal 
with regard 
to mode 
• 
Regime in 
itself 
the best 
a)The best 
regime de-
sirable (The model 
regime) 
b)The less 
evil 
a)The best regime de-
sirable for a oity 
suoh as that under 
oonsideration 
b)The best regime pos-
sible for this oity 
Point of 
view prao-
tioal with 
regard to 
mode and 
oonorete. (The best 
regime,.. 
relativel!) 
e' 
15 "Suivant le point de vue, la solution variera. Aussi 
risquerait-on fort de ne pas saisir dans toutes ses nuanoes 
1a pensee de saint Thomas, et de nty voir en definitive 
qu'affirmations oontradiotoires, si lion ntavait soin de 
poser au preab1e quelques distinotions." ibid., p. 4. 
16 ~., p.76. ----
17 lliS.., p.g. 
5 
In this thesis it is proposed that Demongeot's schema 
be modified by the elimination of the first member -- "purely 
speculative and abstract· -- for the following reasons: 
(1) The introduction of "formal logic" gives the question an 
essentialist aspect. (2) It woulcrkeem that the considera-
tion of "the best government absolutely· does not belong out-
side the practioal order; such a con:ideration is still within 
the field of moral philosophy. IS 
The elimination of the ·pure1y speculative and abstract" 
member would seem to be possible if we utilize a more profound 
analysis of practical knowledge. The consequent reduotion of 
the state of the question to the oonfines of the praotioa1 
would seem to bring us oloser to the oonceptual framework 
within whioh st. Thomas considered the question of forms of 
government. For in his prologue to his CommentarI ~ the 
Politics he says: 
---------------... 
Secondly we must give an acoount 
of the genus of this soienoe. For 
lS This point will be more fully disoussed in chapter II. 
Here it will suffioe to note that the thing whioh is 
operable beoomes the objeot of a purely speculative know-
ledge only on the supposition that its quid est is ex~lu­
sively attended to. Of. Oajetan's commentary on la, q.1~, 
a.16: •••• per specu1ativam ex modo tantum, id est de ob-jeoto operabi1i modo speou1ativo, non intelligitur scientia 
de operabi1i in universali ••• sed intelligitur soientia 
de operabili sorutans non quomodo res fiat, sed quid est.' 
So long as it remains a question of "Ie meilleur gouverne-
ment" this supposition does not seem verifiable. 
since practical sciences are 
distinguished from speculative 
sciences in that the speculative 
are ordered only to the knowledge 
of the truth while the practical 
are ordered to operation, this 
science has to be a part of prac-
tical philosophy. ' .• t.pis has to 
be since the state is a certain 
kind of whole about which the hu-
man reason is not only knowing 
but also operating. Moreover, 
since there is a reasoning which 
is concerned with maKing by an 
operation which passes over to 
external matter -- this pertains 
to the so-called mechanical arts, 
such as carpentry, ship-building, 
etc. -- and since, on the other 
hand, there is a reasoning which 
is concerned with action by an 
operation which remains in him 
who acts-- examples of this are 
counselling, choosing, willing, 
etc., and such actions pertain 
to moral science --, it is evi-
dent that political science, 
which deals with ordering among 
men, is not to be placed under 
the sciences concerned with mak-
ing, i.e., the mechanical arts, 
but rather is to be placed under 
the sciences concerned with act-
ing, i.e., the moral sciences. 
.' 
Oollocation of the question wholly within the practical 
realm brings the whole line of discussion into continuity 
with prudence ("practical wisdomlt), 19 which will make.the 
---_ ....... -.. __ ... ---. 
6 
19 Throughout this thesis we are understanding 'prudence" in 
the sense that st. Thomas uses it, ViZ., as the moral vir-
tue of prudence. This term has suffered great debilitation 
by the modern connotations attaching to it. We hope it 
will be olear from the development of our thesis that it 
i8 a grave injustice to St. Thomas to interpret his 
final judgment a8 to the form of rule in a given case'. This 
last point is most important in any attempt to recover the 
Thomistic approach to this question. Karitain has said: 
The more one meditates on the 
moral teaching of ~t! Thomas, 
the more one remarrs"Ytha t this 
concrete continuity) the effec-
tive continuity of the whole 
order of the practical} is con-
stantly presupposed (without 
prejudice to the dif~rences of 
nature between the faculties or 
the habits which are involved). 
rrom moral philosophy down to 
the prudential act, a single 
concrete intention traverses 
the whole order of practical 
thinking, which becomes less 
and less -science l in the de-
gree that it becomes more and 
more -practical-. 20 
---... -----------
7 
·prudence· as·expediency·. This is what Professor Adler 
does in the following passages: IIf the rule for the com-
mon interest is the only principle which distinguishes ~ 
good from bad government, and if the number of persons 
who exercise rule fails to distinguish types of good gov-
ernment as grades of perfection, the only argument which 
can be made for the superiority of one type of good gov-
ernment over another is entirely prudential: that one is 
a more expedient means for achieving the common good. Thus 
st. Thomas argues for the superiority of monarchy in De 
Regimine .••• What is said here against St. Thomas can be 
said similarly against other political writers who have 
used the principle of number to distinguish one good state 
from another, and have therefore been forced to orde~·these 
good forms of government as better or worse entirely in 
terms of expediency ••••• (Mort1mer J. Adler in "Round 
Table Discussion: Problem -- In Terms of What Moral Prin-
ciple Is Democracy the Best Government,· Proceedings of 
The Amer1can Catholio Philosoph1cal Assoo1ation, XV 1939 
p.l45 -- 1tal1cs Adlerts.) 
20 Cf. Les degres du savo1r, Paris, Descl'e, 1932, p.g9l. 
g 
We shall attempt to show that the defeot of Demongeoyts olas-
sifioation is that by ino1uding the speou1ative member it 
fails to keep this fundamental oontinuity. 21 
In the effort to resolve the apparent disorepanoies in 
the Thomistio teaching on the besf form of government our pro-
cedure will be as follows: First we shall present and disauss 
a sohematization representing the orlanization of moral know-
ledge. We shall then propose the hypothesis that the "dis-
orepanoies· are due to the level of moral knowledge at which 
in eaoh oase the problem is considered. 
With regard to the sources of the texts upon which this 
thesis is based, it should be noted in the first place that 
the De reg imine is not being used. The portion of the De 
-
regimine whioh is to be attributed to st. Thomas seem~not to 
be, if taken as a whole, really pertinent to the problem of~ 
the best form of governance. The De regimine is not a guide 
to choice (which, as the development of our thesis wi1i Show, 
is the central consideration in our problem); so far as Cyprus 
to whose sovereign the work is addressed, was conoerned, the 
choice had already been made. In this sense, the R! regimine 
oontains "second intention" politics ; it assumes the qui'stion 
----------------
21 lot that Demongeot ignores the funotion of prudenoe (see 
~. 211., p.~); but he does not make what seems to be the 
neoessary integration with the eventual prudential deoision 
to present in its fullness the Thomistic approach to this 
problem. 
9 
we are disoussing as already answered. 22 There are~f oourse 
some texts in st. Thomas's portion of the De regimine whioh 
oould be oited with pertinenoe in the development of our the-
sis. But if these texts are not adduoed, there is no real 
. 
loss,for the dootrine they represebf is repeated in other 
plaoes. And in view of the oharaoter we have assigned to 
st. Thomas's portion of the De regimine taken as a whole, it 
i 
would seem that our thesis will have a olearer line if texts 
from this work are left out of disoussion. 
The prinoipal question in the mat.ter of souroes is what 
use may legitimately be made of the Oommentary ~ the Politios 
of Aristotle. There is a wide variety of opinion. Georg,von 
Hertling formulated the following rule: 
••• that eaoh passage of the 
Oommentaries on Aristotle must 
be oonsidered for itself and 
that suoh passages oan be ad-
duoed as representing Thomas's 
own views only when, inasmuoh 
as, and insofar as their oon-
firmation oan be found in his 
other writings. 23 
Aotually, however, this hardly takes us beyond the position 
of Antoniades, for whom the Oommentaries represent simply and 
----------------
22 There is thus some merit to the proposal of Father Ohenu, 
whioh we noted earlier, p. J. 
23 Georg von Bertling, 'Zur Beantwortung der Gottinger 
Jubilaumsrede,' Kleine Sohriften zur Zettgesohiohte und 
Politik, Freiburg i. B., 1997, p.161, oited by Muller;-
.QE. • .ill., p·3· 
10 
solely the thought of Aristotle. 24 At the other ex~eme is 
Baumann; according to him the Oommentaries may be taken as 
containing the thought of St. Thomas. 25 Demongeot notes the 
opinion of reugueray that "the essential interest of the Q2!-
. 
. 9 .. ., 
mentaries is that they teaoh us the politioal vocabulary of 
at. Thomas." 26 ,This is the view whioh Demongeot adopts; it 
will likewise be ours. 
Briefly, one can say that st. 
Thomas makes his own everything 
in the politics of Aristotle 
which 1s not in conflict with 
his theology •••• In our view, 
as a consequence of the princi-
ples we are going to propose, 
the Oommentaries furnish all 
the conoepts, all the "matter" 
of St. Thomas's own politioal 
thought, to be modified when 
neoessary in the light of the 
principles oontained in the Sum-
~ and the De regimine princr=-
pum. 27 
We are now ready to proceed with the presentation of our 
hypothesis. The next chapter will discuss the organization of 
moral knowledge. In acoordance with the schema this organiza-
tion seems to imply, we shall attempt to assign st. Thomas's 
various oonsiderations of the problem of the best form of 
24 Basilius Antoniades, ~ Staats1ehre des Thomas !£ Aguino, 
Leipzig, 1990, p. 3. 
25 J. J. Baumann, Die ataats1ehre ~ a. Thomas ~ Aguino, 
Leipzig, Hirzel, 1973, pp. 74=75. 
26 Demongeot, ~. £!i., p. 16. 
27 Ibid., p. 17. + 
11 
government to their proper plaoe in the sohema. The~ast 
three ohapters' will therefore be devoted suooessively to in-
dioating what we believe are the speculatively-praotioal, 
praotioally-praotioal, and prudential oonsiderations • 
• 
.' 
CHAPTER II 
THE ORGANIZATION OF MORAL 
KNOWLEDGE 
... ., 
.' 
If, as we have seen, 1 St. Thomas places politioal con-
siderations under the genus of practjcal knowledge, it would 
seem that we must look to the organization of moral knowledge 
to resolve any 'disorepancies· in his political teaching. It 
is our hope to present by way of hypothesiS the framework to-
gether with its levels within which St. Thomas treats the 
question of the best form of government. To achieve this we 
must make a detailed study of the order of practioal knowing. 
Following Aristotle, St. Thomas divides knowing first of 
all into speculative and practical: 
The theoretical, or speculative, 
intellect is properly distinguished 
from the operative, or practical, 
intellect in this, that the specu-
lative intellect has for its end 
the truth it considers, whereas the 
praotical intelleot orders the truth 
considered to operation as its end: 
and hence the Philosopher says in 
l!l~ Anima that they differ from 
each other with regard to end, and 
in II Metaphysic. it is said that 
the end of speculative [knowing] is 
...... -------------
1 Cf. chapter I, pp. et seq. 
12 
.. 
truth, and the end of operative, 
or practical, [knowing] is action. 
Since, therefore, it is necessary 
that the matter be proportioned 
to the end, it is necessary that 
the matter of the practical soienoes 
be those things whioh oan be done 
by our effort, so\h.t the knowledge 
of those things oan be ordered to 
operation as an end. But the matter 
of the speoulative soienoes must be 
things which are not done by our 
work; whenoe their oqpsideration 
oannot be ordered to operation as 
an end, and it is in aooordanoe with 
this distinotion among things that 
the speoulative soienoes are dis-
tinguished. 2 
The end is the basis of this division: 
Sinoe philosophy or the arts are 
distinguished into theoretioal and 
praotioal [branches], this distinc-
tion must be based upon their end; 
thus the practioal is said to be 
that whioh is ordered to operation 
and the theoretioal, that whioh is 
ordered only to knowledge of the 
truth. 3 
13 
Here, however, we ought to note that a thing operable in 
, 
itself may beoome the object of a purely speoulative consid-
eration. This ocours when "an operable thing is not consid-
ered as operable." 4 st. Thomas has oocasion to point out 
this possibility in discussing Godts speoulative knowleqge 
2 Ia Boetii de Trinitate, q.5, a.l. Of. ~ veritate, q.2, 
a. 8j ~.1., la, q.79, a. 11; IA ~ Anima, lib. III, 
leot. 15. 
3 In~. de !rin., q. 5, a. 1, ad b. 
4 ~ veritate, q. 3, a. 3. Of. ad 2um. 
of oreated things: 
••• A soienoe oan be oalled speou-
lative: ••• first, beoause the 
things known are not operable by' 
the knower -- suoh is man's know-
ledge of natural or divine things; 
seoond, beoause of.tite mode of 
knowing, as for example, a builder 
oonsidering a house by defining, 
dividing, and pondering its univer-
sal predioates. This latter is to 
oonsider operable thipgs in a speou-
lative manner, and no~ insofar as 
they are operable. For the operable 
is something by reason of the appli-
oation of form to matter and not by 
reason of the resolution of a oom-
posite into its universal formal 
prinoiples. 5 
14-
It is to this latter type of ~nowledge that Demongeot's 
first division, i.e. "purely speoulative and abstraot," oor-
responds. It is our opinion, however, that it is impossible 
to raise the question of "the best government", even "abso-
lutely" or "takentnakedlytl, 6 on this level. Questions 
---------------
5 8.1., la, q.l4-, a.16, o. Of. Karitain's oomment on this pas-
sage: "11 oonvient de remarquer que dans oette question 1~, 
a.16, saint Thomas, quand il parle de 1a soienoe de mode 
speoulatif d'un objet dtoperation, ne pense pas a 1a oon-
naissanoe que nous appelons ioi speoulativement pratique, 
~ar exemple a la philosophie morale. Oomme le note Oajetan ('per speoulativam ex modo tantum, id est de objeoto opera-
bili modo speoulativo, non intelligitur soientia de o~era­
bili in universali, •.• sed intel1igitur solentla de opera-
bili sorutans non quomodo res fiat, sed quld est'), 11 pense 
a un oonnalssanoe purement speoulative dtun objet qui par 
ailleurs se trouve etre operable. C'est ainsi que Dieu a 
des ohoses qu t l1 fait ou peut faire une oonnaissanoe non 
seulement pratique mais aussl speoulative, qui oorrespond 
,sureminemment a notre s~voir purement speoulatif de oes 
memes objets." Les degres du savoir, p.gg7. 
6 Q2. £!i., p.7g • 
15 
appropriate to this level aooording to the mind of S?~ Thomas 
would be seemingly: "Is house a substanoe? Is house a genus?" 
Or, in terms of our present matter: "Is society" an ~ ration-
!!? etc." 7 The question of the va~ue of a form of government 
.. .;" has its earliest possible entrance at the first division of 
practical knowledge. It is only at this level that the ulti-
mate end begins to play its part as Rrinoiple; g henoe it i8 
only here that the question of better or best oan begin in-
telligibly to be asked. 
Now, as Karitain notes, it is fundamental to a true con-
ception of the order of praotioa1 knowing to conoeive the 
whole order as embodying a continuity9with the prudential 
judgment: 
Because practical knowledge is 
as it were, a continuous movement 
---------------
7 This is the answer given (as we think, erroneously) by 
Father I. Th. Esohmann, O.P.: IKais en thomisme e11e est 
bien un lens rationis.'H in'Oompte Rendu', Bulletin thomiste 
V (192g), p.710. Of. the similar opinion of J. Stepa, RLe 
oaraotere total de l"tat d l apres S. Thomas d'Aquin,· Studia' 
Gnesnensia, .III (1935"), pp. 4-29-441. The view we take of 
what kind of reality sooiety is has been expressed by Father 
William Ferree, S.M., The !2i Qt Social Justice, Washington, 
Oatho1io University, 1943A pp. 166 et seq. It is based on 
S.T., Iallae, q.7, a.1,0. • 
g Tprincipum autem tot ius ordinis in mora1ibus est finis u1-
timus qui ita se habet in operativis siout principum inde-
monstrabile in speoulativie." i-!., Iallae, q.72, a.5; Of. 
Iallae, q.73, a.3; ibid., ad 3um; Iallae, q.90, a.1. See 
Ohar1es J. O'lei1, "The Unity of the Moral Order," The lew 
Soholastioism, XV (194-1), pp_ 2g0-2g3. ------
9 H ... non pas d' essenoe maie de tendanoe ou de direction .... 
Maritain, Les degree du savoir, p.ggg. 
16 
of thought which moves down .' 
towards the placing of the con-
crete aot in existenoe, its 
practical character, present 
from the beginning, becomes 
progressively intensified, be-
coming entirely dominant in 
prudence: there it. ,.pgu1fs 
the whole; and while the pru-
dential judgment always involves 
knowing, its proper truth does 
not oonsist in knowing that 
which is, but rather in direct-
ing that which ought to be done. 10 
According to Karitain, there is a three-fold division to be 
made in the practical order of knowing: speculatively-prac-
tical; practically-practical, and prudential. 
It is the function of speculatively-practical knowledge 
to regulate action from afar, 
and henoe to aot upon the will 
~ afar by the knowledge it~ 
self. In view of this end, it 
organizes in a praotioal oon-
text the matters with whioh it 
deals and it disoovers in them 
the ontological artiou1ations 
related to aotion, adapting to 
its praotioa1 purpose a oonoep-
tual equipment of modes of de-
fining and judging still typioa1-
1y speou1ative. 11 
It is this type of knowledge whioh Aristotle oa11s praotica1 
philosophy; it includes ethios, "eoonomios', po1itioa1 phi1-
- . 
o sophy , eto. 12 In this division belongs also moral theology, 
10 Ibid., p. g79. 
11 Ibid., p. g79 - gSO. 
12 Ibid., p. 6~0. 
in the sense that the Ia IIae and the IIaIIae ~f the·'Summa 
of St. Thomas are moral theology. 13 
Olaiming to base his proposal on the prinoiples ot 
17 
st. Thomas, 14 Karitain (and Yves ,Simon 15 after him) wants 
to introduoe between the speoulatively-praotioal and the 
prudential 16 la fourth dimension". 17 This is the level 
...... -------------
13 Not therefore moral theology in the sense of St. Alphonsus 
Liguori. Of. HAinsi dans beauooup de taoultes de theologi. 
on a ete amene a ajouter au oours de theologie morale spe-
oulative, ou lion explique les sujets trait~s par saint 
Thomas dans la IaIIae et la IIaIIae, un oours de theologie 
morale pratique oonQue du iOint' de vue de la theologie de 
saint Alphonse de Liguori. ~., p. g92, n.l·. 
Itt 'The distinction between speoulatively-praotioal moral 
knowing and the praotioally-praotioal moral soienoes seems 
to me solidly based on St. Thomas' prinoiples, though, so 
far as I know, St. Thomas never explioitly formulat·ed it. 
His own plan of thought was that of speoulativesoienoe 
and speoulatively-praotioal sOienoe. u Karitain, Soienoe 
~ Wisdom, ,p. l3g , n.2. , 
15 Yves Simon, Oritique de la oonnaissano, morale,. Paris, ~ 
Desolee, 1934, pp. 53 et seq. 
16 "Entre la prudenoe et Ie savoir speoulativement pratique 
nfy a-t-il pas un zone de oonnaissanoe intermediaire?'Oui, 
repondons-nous en explioitant les prinoipes de saint Thom-
as, olest la soienoe pratique au sens etroit du mot, disons 
Ie -savoir prati6uement pratique. 1I Maritain, ~ degree du savoir, pp. 23-624. 
17 r ... il y a dans le monde lu1-meme de lfespr1t des dif-
ferenoiat10ns struoturales et une d1vers1t' des dimensions 
qulil importe avant tout de reoonna!tre, et lIon ne saurait 
eviter des malentendus graves qu'en prenant soin drassigner , / 
a ohaque ,type de pensee sa situation exaote dans oette 
sorte de topique transoendentale. Les differenoes dont 
nous parlons ioi oonoernent la 'quatri'eme dimension,' selon 
laque11e llesprit diversi!ie ses valeurs de oonnaissanoes 
au grade ses finalites propres." Maritain, Les degres 
dusavoir, p. 626. 
\ 
of the practically-practioal sciences. 19 These sciences 
differ from the speculatively-practical sciences by -the 
mode of defining and conceptualising and their ~ •• typical 
ways of constructing conoepts." 19 This knowledge is science 
.~ Beoause, if it is much more 
particularized than moral 
theology or ethios, if it 
considers oases in detail, 
it still nonetheless ,mbraces 
as its proper object, the 
universal and the reasons 
of being. 20 
But its mode is different from that of the speculatively-
practical: 
The mode, practioal ~ oom-
positive not only with regard 
to the oonditiqns of the objeot 
known but also with regard !£ 
the very struoture of the means 
of apprehending ~ judging, 
does not oharacterize only pru" 
denoe, whioh immediately regu-
lates the act to be done hio et 
nunc by a judgment and a command 
appropriate to the absolute 
individual~zation of the con" 
crete case; it characterizes 
also (though to a lesser degree) 
a science of human action whioh, 
different from prudence, has 
for its object to o~ganize uni-
versal truths and which never-
theless proceeds no longer per 
~-------~--~~-~ 
19 On the differenoe between the expressions "speculativo-
practical' and "practico-praotioal" and the expressions 
·speculatively-praotioal" and "practically-praotical", 
see Simon, S2. £!i., pp. 53-5~ and gO-gl. 
19 Karitain, Science and Wisdom, p. 13g. 
20 Maritain, Les degres du savoir, p. 62~. 
principia remota operationis 
as does moral philosophy (which 
this scienoe presupposes) but 
per prinoipia proxima operati-
onis. 21 
.' 
In this division belong the works of "the great intuitives, 
. 
;;. .,;" from Montaigne and Pascal to Nietzsohe, from Shakespeare to 
Racine and Baudelaire, from Swift or Meredith to Balzac and 
Dostoievsky." 22 Here likewise be~ng the moral teaohing 
of St. Alphonsus Liguori and the case-studies of moralists 
coming after him. 23 
An adequate division of the practioal order of knowing 
would apparently, then, have three levels: speculatively" 
praot'ioalj praotically-practioal, and prudential. It will 
be our task in the remainder of our thesis to oollooate the 
19 
various treatments by st. Thomas of the problem of the best 
form of government to what we conoeive to be their proper .~ 
levels in the praotioal order of knowing. 
21 ~., p. g92. 
22 ~., p. 626. -
23 Of., ibid., p. g92, no. 1, and Soienoe ~ Wisdom, 
pp. 144-145. 
OHAPTER III 
THE FORMS OF GOVERNMENT: THE SPEOULATIVELY ... 
PRAOTIOAL OONSIDERATION 
. 
. .. ., 
As St. Thomas pOints out in the beginning of his commen-
taries on the fourth book of Aristotle's Politics, the polit-
ical philosopher has to consider a wide range of topics: 
It is evident that it belongs 
to this same sCience, namely, 
political sCience, to consider 
which is the best form of gov-
ernment. This latter is that 
which is especially desirable 
and which is willed unless 
there be some extrinsic imped-
iment •••• Also it behooves the 
political philosopher to con-
sider which is the best form 
of government in view of cer-
tain conditions. 1 
The political philosopher's task does not stop at this point: 
Likewise, it pertains to the 
political philosopher to con-
sider which form of government 
is best in view of conditions, 
and those not ideal conditions 
but conditions which are not 
unqualifiedly good •••• Besides 
all these things the political 
philosopher considers which 
form of government is fitting 
for which commonwealth. 2 
.................. _----- .. _-- ... -
1 Oomm. in Pol., IV, 1. 
2 Ibid. --
- 20 
In discussing the problem of the best form of gover~nt we 
are faced with a complex question. 
21 
For st. Thomas politia or respublica oonnoted the organ-
ization of government and its personnel. 3 Kore than this, 
. 
however, it is the form of the civ\fas; 4 it makes the £!!!-
tas to be that which it is. 5 
social life. 6 
Government is a necessity for 
st. Thomas was aware that the forms of government are 
numerous in variety: 
The diversity of governments 
derives first of all from the 
diversity of ends and then 
from the diversity of ways of 
. regarding the end ••.• Because 
peoples ohoose diverse ends 
or ohoose the same end in dif-
ferent ways and pursue the end 
through various means, they 
make diverse ways of life and 
oonsequently diverse forms of 
government. For diverse ways 
of living are diverse forms 
3 Of. the numerous definitions in the Oomm. in Pol.: "Ordo 
frinci~antium" (IV,12); gordo dominantium in civitate" III,6); "ordo principatuum in civitate B (IV,l); "ordina-
tio civitatis quantum ad omnes principatus, sed praeoipue 
quantum ad maximum prinoipatum" (III,5), eto. 
4 Of. such phrases as the following: "ordo civitatis". 
(IV,lO); "vita oivitatis" (~.); "ordo inhabitantiUm 
in civitate" (III,7); "communioatio 01vium" (III 2), etc. 
5 Of. "mutata politia, non remanet eadem 01vitas· tIII,2); 
"cessante republioa, cessat oivitas· (IV,lO). 
6 "So01alis vita mu1torum esse non posset nisi aliquis 
praesideret, qui ad bonum commune intenderet." S.T., la, 
q.96, a. 4. - -
of government. 7 
At the supreme level of the order of practical knowing, he 
sets about introducing some sort of olassifioation. There 
are many classifications, but two sets of divisions emerge 
. 
as principal. One of these is the·t~aditional tripartite 
22 
double series of forms of rule and their oorruptions, inher-
ited from Plato and Aristotle! monaichy -- tyranny; aristoo-
racy -- oligarohy; republic -- democracy. g The principle 
of division in this classification is ohiefly the number of 
governors involved, although it ought to be noted that qual-
itative oonsiderations playa part also. 9 There is reason 
to oonsider this olassification as of secondary importance 
in the political thought of st. Thomas. 
lor more fundamental and more in acoord with the con-
stant procedure of Thomist practioal philosophy is the clas-~ 
sifioation by reason of ends. 10 For St. Thomas, the ends 
which serve as principles of forms of government come essen-
tially to three: virtue, wealth and freedom. 
~~-~---------~~ 
7 Pol., VII, 6. 
g 017 In Ethic., VIII, 10; Pol., II, 7; III, 6; IV, 3, etc. 
9 Cf., for example, Pol., IV, 11, where in oonnection With 
oligarohy and democracy St. Thomas denies that number is 
the only distinction: "In prima proponit quod per se de-
terminantur libertate et divitiis et per accidens multi-
tudine et paucitate ••• " Also, Pol., III,6: "Necesse est 
enim quod distinguantur politiae secundum diversitatem 
dominantium." 
10 "Diversitas rerumpublicarum primo est ex diversitate finis, 
deinde ex diverso modo se habendi ad ipsum ••• • f2!., VII,6. 
In distributive justioe, the 
more of the common goods accrue 
to a person, the greater the 
power he has in the community. 
low in an aristocratic commun-
ity the power is distributed 
according to virtue; in an oli" 
garchic community, ~~ording to 
wealth; in a.democratic commun-
ity, according to freedom; and 
in other types of community, 
according to some other prin-
ciple. 11 • 
23 
We can thus speak of three principles of forms of government: 
the aristocratic principle, the oligarchic, and the democra-
tic. The classification, however, is not yet complete. In 
the first·place we must add to our list monarchy. From one 
aspect, monarchy and aristocracy belong to the same genus; 
they both are 'according to virtue.' 12 But when the impor-
tant consideration of unity, which we are soon to discuss, 
is taken into account, the difference between monarchy and .~ 
aristocracy widens. "Monarchy and the aristocratic state are 
per ~ contraries; for they intend diverse ends and the one 
corrupts the other.' 13 In the second place we shall have to , 
include in our list a form of governance in which the end is 
the individual good sought at the expense of the common good. 
-
--------------~ 
11 S.!., IIallae, q.6l, a.2; cf. also, ~., IV,2 and IV,7. 
12 TSicut assumitur princeps secundum virtutem in statu op-
timatum, sic in regno." And further along: "Regnum est 
institutem secundum statum optimatum." Pol., IV, 7. 
13 Pol., V, 10. 
This is tyranny. Sinoe, however, its end is so oppos~d to 
the true good of the community, tyranny is only improperly 
to be called a form of government. 
The full Thomist olassification seems to be that which 
.... ., 
is given in compact form in the Summa Theo1ogica: 
Human laws are distinguished 
according to the diverse forms 
of government of statts. One 
of these, aocording to the Phil-
o sopher, is mona.rohy, when, name-
ly, the state is governed by one 
man ••• ; another form of rule is 
aristooracy, that is, the rule 
of the best men or of the nobles 
••• ; another form of rule is oli-
garohy, that is the rule of a few 
rioh or powerful. men ••• ; another 
form of rule is that of the peo-
ple, and this is oa11ed demooracy 
••• ; another is the tyrannioa1 
form of rule, which is altogether 
oorrupt. 14-
These 'are what might be oa11ed the "simple" types of rule; .,.. 
tha,t is, eaoh of these -has its own proper principle, and eaoh 
is irreduoib1e to the other. It is true that St. Thomas adds 
to this list another regimen, the Imixture of those forms," 15 , 
but, as we shall see, consideration of this form belong.s to 
a level lower along the line of practical knowirig. 
Here, we should perhaps note before prooeeding to discuss 
14- S.T., lalla8, q.95, a.4-. __ 
15 TEst etiam aliquod regimen ex istis commixtum quod est 
optimum." Ibid. 
25 
st. Thomas's judgment on the respective value of the ~imple 
regimes, that two other sets of distinctions are to be found 
in the Commentary ~ the Politics. These distinctions regard 
modes of government rather than forms properly so called. 16 
. 
. .,;, 
The first set of distinotions i~ ooncerned with 'the politi-
oal regimen' and 'the royal regimen'. 17 The political reg-
imen differs from the royal in the element of constitution, 
as already noted, IS and in that it is found where men are 
free and equal 19 and in that the multitude has the right 
of choosing and reprimanding the governors. 20 The second 
distinction of mode in governance is that between 'the domi-
native" and lithe political'. The dominative is __ that in which 
the governor is the master of his subjects, 21 in which the 
.. __ .. v.e_ .. _.-__ ........ 
16 See t Demongeot, .QR.. ~., pp. '-1-2 and lj.lj.. 
17 ·Civitas autem duplici regimine regitur, SCilicet, politr: 
co et regali. Regale quidem est regimen quando ille qui 
civitati praeest habet plenariam potestatem. Politicum 
autem regimen est quando ille qui praeest habet potestatem 
coarctam secundum aliquas leges civitatis.' Pol., I,l. 
'Hic loquitur de principatu politico secundum-quod politi- , 
cum distinguitur aregali." ~., I,5. 
IS Ibid.' -
19 ipolitica est principatus liberorum et aequalium; unde com-
mutantur personae principantes et subjectae propter aequal-
itatem et constituuntur etiam principatus vel in uno vel 
in diversis officiis.· ~., I, 5. • 
20 lIn civilibus principatibus transmutantur personae princi-
pantes et subjectae; qui enim sunt in officio principatus 
uno anno, subditi sunt alio ••• N ~. I, 10. "In aliqua 
politia non expedit multitudinem habere potestatem in eli-
gendo et corrigendo, sicut in regno ••• ; sed in politica 
ubi multitudo est aequalis, expedit." Pol., III, 10. 
21 "Est quidem principatus dominativus in-quo princeps est 
dominus subditorum." 12l., III, 3. 
26 
subjeots are as slaves, 22 and in whioh the governor.$eeks 
only his own individual interest. 23 This mode of government 
is either tyranny, when the domination of the governor is im-
posed by foroe, or despotism, when the domination is aooepted 
. 
voluntarily. ~4 The politioal mod; tas politioal is used in 
terms of' this distinotion, i.e., as opposed to dominative) is 
that in whioh the subjeots are dealt.with as free men, 25 as 
equals of the governor, 26 and are directed to their proper 
good. 27 
We may now ask what St. Thomas thought of the respeotive 
value of the "simple" types of rule, whioh we have taken to 
be his prinoipal classification. Here it will be in order to 
put down the criterion aocording to which St. Thomas judges 
...... .,., .. _------_ ... -.. 
22 "Oportet quod ille qui est simplioiter bonus oivis soiat 
et prinoipari et subjioi prinoipatui, soilioet non domin~ 
tivo qui est servorum, sed politico qui est. liberorum."Ibld 
23 "Duplex est prlnoipatus, unus quidem qui prinoipaliter esr-
ad bon~ princlpantis, propter autem bonum subditi seoun-
dum acoidens; alius autem est qui principaliter est prop-
ter aliquod bonum subditorum, vel alicujus oommunis prin-
oipanti et subjecto, et oonsequenti propter utilitatem , 
prinoipantis." fQ.l., VII, 10. "Haeo enim est differentia 
inter dominativum prinoipatum et oivilem, quia prinoipans 
prinoipatu dominativo prinoipatur per se propter utilita-
tem subditi, et e oontrario est di oivill." Pol., VII, 10. 
24 "In il10 prinoipatu [despotioo] subditi subjICruntur 4yran-
nO,voluntarie, quia inclinantur ad subjioiendum tall prln-
cipatui, slcut in prinoipatu barbarorum." Pol., IV, 9. 
25 "Politioa est principatus eorum qui sunt 11beri seoundam 
naturam, despotiqa autem eat principatus servorum." ~., 
I, 5. 
26 "Est quidam prinolpatus seoundum quem aliquisprinoipatur 
non sicut dominus servis, sed siout liberis et sibi aequal-
ibus, et hio est oivilis pr~ncipatus." Pol., III, 3. 
27 Cf. Pol., VII, 10, and VII, 11. See n. 23, above. 
27 
the best form of governance. His oriterion may be p~sented 
in the following few citations: 
The, goodness of a thing is dis- ' 
cerned from its relation to the 
end. 2g -- Something is said 
to be good insofar ~~ it is per-
fect. 29 -- The best state is 
determined by the best end. 30 --
The best form of government is 
that according to which the state 
governs and lives bes;. 31 
Which of the simple forms of government is the best? 
There is'a statement in the beginning of the fourth lecture 
of the Oommentary on the sixth book of the Politics, which 
while it is probably not from the hand of St. Thomas him-
self, 32 seems succinctly to summarize his answer to this 
question: "The best form of government speaking absolutely 
is monarchy, in whic~ one man holds the power." St. Thomas 
in several places offers monarchy as the best form of goverI\:ll 
ment; the principal re'ason for his selection is in accord 
with his criterion -- peace is the end of gover~~ent and the 
best cause of unity is that which is itself one. 
The best form of rule for a mul-
titude is that it should be ruled 
by one man. This is evident from 
2g ~., IV, 11. 
29 I.!., 'la, q.5, a·5. 
30 fQl., VII, 10. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Only the first four books seem to have been written by 
St. Thomas. Of. Demongeot, ~. 2!!., p.15. 
, 
the end of rule, which is peace. .' 
For peace and the unity of his 
subjec·ts is the end of the ruler. 
But one man is a more fitting 
cause of unity than many men a.re; 33 
The same idea is expressed in the Summa Theologica: 
Governance is nothi~~other than 
the direction of those governed 
to an end, which is 80me good. 
But unity pertains to the ratio 
of goodness, as Boeth~us proves 
from this, that as aIr things 
desire good so also they desire 
unity, without which they oannot 
be. Each thing insofar as it is, 
to that extent is one. Whence 
we see that a thing resists its 
division as muoh as it can and 
tha.t the dissolution of anything 
proceeds from a defect in that 
thing. And therefore that to-
wards which the intention of one 
governing a multitude is directed 
is unity, i.e., peace. But a 
caus! p~r ~ of unity is one. 
For 1t 1S obvious that a plural-
i ty o·f things cannot unite and 
bring to~ether many things, un-
less the plurality of things is 
itself united in some way. But 
that which is per ~ one can be 
more readily the cause of unity 
than can many things united. Hence 
a multitude is better governed by 
one man than by many men. 3~ 
Another argument for monarchy is that it most resembles the 
divine governance of the world: "Monarchy is the best form 
of government and the most divine and the most in accord 
.. -.... - ... -.. ------.... 
33 Contra Gent.,. IV, 76. 
3~ 1-!., la, q.103, a·3· 
29 
with right reason." 35 
This, then, is St. Thomas's conclusion at the top-level 
of the practical order of knowing, where the mode is most 
speculative: 36 "Among right forms of rule monarchy is the 
best and most right of the forms 01 iovernance." 37 Monarchy 
is "the rule and the measure of the others"; 3g eo much so, 
that it gives its name-to the specia\ ratio of prudenoe in-
volved in any other form of government. 39 It is, according 
to St. Thomas, the form of regimen that would have obtained 
if man had remained in the state of innocence. 40 
But a.s we have al~eady noted at the beginning of this 
ohapter, for st. Thomas, the political philosopherls consid-
eration of the best form of government is to include not only 
oonsideration of the best absolutely speaking but also con-
---------------
33~ Pol., IV, 1. Of. ~.T., Iallae, q.l05, a.l, ad 2um. o Y!Qognitio ••• practioa efficituJU per extensionem specu-lativae ad opus." ~ veritate, q.2, a.g. Of. S.!_, la, 
q.79, a.11; ~. in De Anima, lib. III, lect. 15. 
3
3Z ~., III, 13. 
o Ibid. , 
39 HRegnum inter alias politias est optimum regimen, ut dioi-
tur~ Et ideo species prudentiae magis debuit denominari 
a regno; ita tamen quod sub regnativa comprehendantur 
omnia alia regimina recta, non autem perversa, quae vir-
tuti opponuntur: unde non pertinent ad prudentiam."· 
~.!., IIallae, q.50, a.1, ad 2um. 
40 Of. In II ~., d. 44, q.1, a.3, sol. lor the compati-
bility of the inequality involved and the state of inno-
cenoe, see St. Thomas's argumen~ by analogy with the oon-
dition of the angels in S.l., la, q.9~, a.4, I.C. Of. 
NEs sei noch hervorgehoben naoh Thomas auoh im Stande der 
Unsohuld die J'orm der Regierung gewesen lein wf:trde'. It . 
Maller, 2£. £!i., p.g5. 
30 
sideration of the best in view of conditions. ~l In .is view 
of the requirements of the question, "it is necessary to con-
sider in the beginning what sort of thing can be done and 
what sort of thing can be maintained over a period of time." 
. 
He was well aware that the best fofm~absolutely speaking 
would be the object of volition only on condition that there 
was no extrinsio impediment. ~2 
• 
Asa theologian, St. Thomas could not, of course, share 
an optimism about the natural goodness of man such as Jean 
Jacques Rousseau was later to introduce into political think-
ing. He knew that because of the effects of Original Sin, 
"more men follow the inclinations of sensitive nature than 
follow the order of reason." ~3 He knew the effect of this 
on political life: ·romes, that is, the inclination toward 
sensuality, does not incline to the common good, but rather .~ 
to the private good." ~~ He recognized as well the effects 
for many men on the all-important prudence: "many men there 
are in whom prudence of the flesh is dominant." 4s 
He was thus well prepared for the possibility that a 
---------------
~l Cf. the passage already cited from Pol. IV, 1. • 
~2 "Haec [optima politia] autem est quae maxime desideratur, 
et est secundum voluntatem, si non sit impedimentum per 
aliquod extrinseoum." ~. 
~3 Iallae, q.71, a.2, ad 3um. 
~4 Iallae, q.91, a.6, obj. 3. 
~5 Iallae, q.93, a.6, obj. 2. 
, 
31 
king, whom it behooves to possess perfeot virtue, 46 ·might 
nullify the advantages whioh aoorue to kingship per ~ as a 
souroe of unity by his laok of experienoe, stupidity or weak-
ness. ~7 And so st. Thomas desoends from the oonsideration 
. 
of the question of the best form 01 government on the top-
level of praotioal knowledge to a point somewhat lower on the 
line that runs through this order of.knowing. His purpose 
is to make a general oonsideration of the diffioulties likely 
to be faoed by a regime. This we might oall the oonsidera-
tion of the best form of government in view of oonditions. 
In general, the dangers to be met by a form of govern-
ment are two: degeneration into tyranny and re~olution. 
Tyranny oan arise in any form of rule: "rrom a demooratio 
state whioh is too proud there arises tyranny; similarly, 
from the power of a few." ~g But tyranny would seem most 
likely to eventuate from monarohy, whose proper oorruption 
it is: 
By reason of the great power 
.. ---_ .... ---------
~6 "Ille qui prinoipatur ••• oportet quod habeat perfeotum 
virtutem moralem." ~., I, 10. "Oportet quod rex ••• 
differat a subditis secundum naturam in quadam magnitu-
dine bonitatis.' Ibid. "Regem, aut solum nomen regis 
oportet habere, et-aeQuivooe, aut talem esse propter 
exoellentiam virtutDset boni universaliter." 121.,IV,1. 
~7 "Ea quae gubernantur ab uno, a se invioem non dissentiunt, 
nisi propter imperitiam aut insipientiam aut impotentlam 
gubernantis." S.l., la, q.l03, a.3, obj. 2. 
4-a l.2.!., IV, 10.) 
f 
oonoeded to a king, monarohy .' 
easily degenerates into tyranny, 
unless he to whom suoh power is 
oonoeded possesses perfeot vir-
tue •••• Perfect virtue, however, . 
is to be found in few men. 49 
The second general diffiou1ty to be~~aken into account is 
the possibility of revolt. In order that a form of govern-
ment be maintained it is necessary that the governed be sat-
isfied: 
In order that a form of govern-
ment may be maintained, it is 
necessary that all parts of the 
state want the form to exist 
and that the form provide suf-
fioient1y for each ,part of the 
state so that that part oan 
preserve its status. 50 
The basic cause of revolution is dissatisfaction with the 
inequalities which are, or appear to be, involved in the 
various forms of government. 51 . Under monarchy, the "vir-
tuous men' other than the king may become restive: 
If one very virtuous man domi-
nates, there will be many more 
who are not honored with the 
dignity of rule. But this is 
not fitting. I 'or from this 
there follow dissensions and 
disturbanoes. 52 
------- .. -------
49 !.1., IaIIae, q.105 1 a.1, ad 2um. 50 fQ!., II, 14. Cf. "In politia reote ordinata quilibet 
d11igit statum et gradum proprium et gradum a1terius. N 
.f.2!.., III, 12. 
51 qf. 12l., V, 1. 
52 Pol., III, g. Of. l2!., 111, 11. 
,.. 
I 
In the aristooratio state, the non-members of the aris'to-
cracy constitute the source of trouble: 
33 
If only the virtuous have the 
power of rule, all the others 
will be laoking in honor, be-
cause they do not attain the 
honor of offioe, foroffioes 
are honors ••.• But this is not 
fitting; for it is the oause of 
dissension. 53 
When the oligarohioal prinoiple is it effeot, the situation 
is muoh the same: 
It seems a terrible thing in 
no wise to share in honors •••• 
[Those who do not share in 
honors] will think themselves 
dishonored, and, sinoe they 
are numerous and poor, there 
will follow sedition and strife 
in the state, and that is ter-
rible. 54 
In view of this general difficulty, i.e., at this level 
of speoulatively-praotioal oonsideration, St. Thomas says: 
"That form of government is best whioh is most laoking in 
sedition and strife.' 55 Weighting the problem of the best 
form of government with this and the other difficulties we 
have discussed, St. Thomas might be said to be making a fresh 
approach to the solution. 
The first step in view of the difficulties met with at 
---------------
553 Pol., III, g. Cf. Pol., V, 6. 
4- Pol., III, 9. 
55 ~., IV, 10, prope finem. 
f 
this lower level is to examine the simple types of fo1ms of 
government other than monarchy. The purpose is to discover 
what advantages each has to offer. Granted the 'superiority 
on the highest level of considerati~n of monarchy by reason 
.... ; 
of its unity, do the other forms offer any remedy to the dif-
ficulties which may make pure monarchy unrealizable? 
In his Commentary on the third Qpok of the Politics, 
st. Thomas discusses one of the advantages peculiar to aris" 
tocracy. It is that of providing a better source of judg-
ments than the single person of a king could ever proffer. 
A plurality of men provide better observation than one alone56 
They are less susceptible to the influence of passion in 
making their judgment. 57 They are able to see more of the 
question being discussed. 5g In addition to this advantage, 
government by the optimates carries.with it something of a ~ 
safeguard against the danger of tyranny: HA plurality of 
good men are more difficult to pervert and corrupt than one 
good man. 1t 59 
\ 
-_ .. -........ -_ .. _--_ ... 
56 Ulnconveniens est dicere quod unus dU9bus oc~lis et duabus 
auribus melius percipiat quam multi multis auribus et 
multis oculis." Pol., III, 15. 
57 "Plures magis sunt indifferentes respectu passionum tur-
bantium et pervertentium judicium rectum, quam unus sive 
pauci." Ibid. 
5g "Plures consiliantes super aliquo plura possunt videre 
quam unus, ergo manifestum est quod unus compara.tus ad 
plures deterior est in judioando." Pol., III, 14. 
59 12l., III, 14. 
I 
,. 
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Aristocracy inoorporates another advantage; it ~alizes 
distributive justioe. "In the rule of the nobles there is a 
distribution of the power of rule acoording to the dignity 
of virtue~' 60 As a matter of faot, it is only in aristoora-
. 
.. .",; 
cy that the virtue of the good man and the good citizen fully 
ooinoide. 61 That distributive justioe be realized is impor-
tant to the peace. 62 
With regard to demooracy, it seems that for St. Thomas 
the principal advantage it prooures is the satisfaction of 
the citizens. In the text which will be a subjeot of exten-
sive consideration in our next chapter, St. Thomas says: 
••• with regard to a good order-
ing of powers in some state or 
people, two things are to be ob-
served: of these, one is that 
all have some part in the power 
of rule; for by this means peaoe 
is preserved among the people, 
and they all like and abide by 
this ordering ••• 63 
It should perhaps be remarked that St. Thomas did not share 
----_ .. _-_ .... _---
60 Pol., IV, 7. 
61 Tftem in sola ista republica [sol. optimatum] idem est 
optimus vir et civie optimus simpliciter." 1!Q1., IV, 6. 
62 •••• cum unusquisque secundum unam dignitatem debea~ 
recipere de bonis oommunibus, quando non recipiunt se-
oundum quod existimant se dignos, faciunt seditionem in 
civitate et mutant rempublicam: ex hoc enim quod non 
recipiunt seoundum existimationem quam habent de se, 
videtur eis, quod fiat eis injustum, et quod contemnan-
tur. Ista autem causa sunt dissensionis.' 1!Q1., V, 1. 
63 1.1., Iallae, q.105, a.l. 
f 
our modern preoccupation with political freedom. 64 Hence 
it is only by anachronism and distortion that he can be made 
a supporter of the contemporary enthusiasm for the democratio 
form, as is sometimes done. 65 
;9 '4; As we have seen, st. Thomas, in his consideration in 
view of conditions, takes account of the difficulties and 
the advantages connected with each o~ the simple types of 
government. After an examination of each type successively, 
he says: •••• the same difficulties turn up all the time. H 66 
Does this consideration alter our answer to the question of 
what is the best form of rule? Yes; for let us remember that 
here 
••• we have not to speak of that 
best form of rule which is willed 
and chosen absolutely. We have 
rather to speak of the best life 
possible for the more men and 
states and of forms of government 
which most states can achieve. 67 
In view of the difficulties, St. Thomas recommends that the 
advantages of the different simple forms be combined: "It 
... --------------.. 
6~ See the well-taken remarks of Jacques Maritain on this 
point in Freedom in the Modern World (New York, Scrib-
ner's, 1936),. pp.~=4b; 54-60; 71-73. Cf. Demongeot, 
~. cit., pp.104 et seq. 
65 Cf., for example, Father Moorehouse F.X.Millarls foreword 
to his James Wilson and the Natural Law Basis of Positive 
Law (New York, Fordham, 1937). - -
66 l2!., III, g. 
67 Pol., IV, 10. 
, 
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will help to mix the aforementioned forms of rule in _he 
states •• 6g In this oombination 'one form of government is 
tempered by being mixed with another, and less ground for 
sedition is provided." 69 We may take as st. Thomas's answer 
. 
.. .. , 
on this level of oonsideration: 'There is some form of rule 
whioh is a mixture of these [sol. monarohy, aristooraoy, oli-
garohy, demOoraoy]; this is best.- ~O 
Thus, we see that St. Thomas gives two answers to the 
question, -What is the best form of government?· The answers 
oorrespond to the level of praotioal knowledge at which the 
question is posed. At the highest level (absolute oonsider-
ation) the decision is in favor of monarohy. At a somewhat 
lower level (consideration with oonditions in view) where 
possible diffioulties of realization are taken into oonsid-
eration in a general way, the answer suggests a mixture --
.,... 
a mixture of the elements in the simple forms that are re-
quired by the ciroumstances. 
But as St. Thomas says: 'Over and above all those things , 
.. ~-.. -----------
6g 19l., II, 7. 
69 Ibid. 
70 1.1., Iallae, q.95, a.4. That this solution is given in 
view of the diffioulties is olear from the discussion of 
them in artiole 1 of this question. Of. Billuart's com-
mentary on a.l: "Leges humanae sunt necessariae non 
quidem simpliciter et absolute, sed sio, ut attenta homi-
num pervioaoia, oorruptlone, et pronitate in malum, sine 
legibus humanis, neo respublica paoem habere et oonser-
vare posset." 
the politioal philosopher likewise oonsiders whioh fo~m of 
government is suitable for whioh state." 71 This latter 
type of oonsideration seems to us to belong to a lower di-
mension of the praotioal order of knowing, namely, the prao-
. 
. ~ 
tioally-praotioal. We further believe that there is a pas-
sage in which St. Thomas makes such a oonsideration. This 
matter will be disoussed in the foll~ing ohapter. 
--~~-----------
71 ~., IV, 1. 
I 
OHAPTER IV 
A PRAOTIOALLY-PRAOTIOAL 
OONSIDERATION 
In discussing the respective value of the simple forms 
of government, Marcel Demongeot rema~s: "It is very foolish 
to wish to make of st. Thomas at all costs a royalist, for 
example, or a democrat." 1 It would, it seems to us, be 
equally inconvenient to identify him with any partioular com-
bination of simple types. 2 As is said in the Oommentary ~ 
the Politics, there is a oonsiderable variety of possible 
combinations. 3 And there is the statement of St. Thomas 
himself, that the combination of oligarohy a~d demooraoy 
which is "politia without qualification" or 'republio, as 
this name is understood in ordinary usage" 4 (and the 
~--~--~-------~ 
1 Demongeot,~. ~., p. 123. 
2 As Demongeot does in reference to the "politia bene oom-
mixta ex regno ••• ex aristooratia ••• et ex demooratia 
••• " disoussed in IaIIae, q. 105, a.l. This is for his 
interpretation "le regime modele" aooording to st. Thomas. 
Of. g£. oit., p. l4S et seq. • 
3 "Oontingit autem oommixtiones Tel oombinationes istarum 
fieri, puta quod aooipiatur oonsiliativum unius et judi-
oium alterius, et s1c de a11is; et seoundum hoo oonting1t 
d1versimode m1soeri respubl1oas •••• Istae en1m partes 
divers1mode oomb1natae faoiunt diTersitatem rerumpubli-
carum." Pol., VI, 1. 
4 Of. fQ!., IV, 7 and 10. 
39 
, 
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oombination of oligarohy and aristooraoy whioh is olosely 
related to it 5 but whioh is diffioult of realization 6) 
"are best and possible to more states and men." 7 And this 
latter is oertainly different from Demongeot's "mixed regime 
properly so oalled." g • .;, 
It is oustomary to oite the text from the Summa Theolo-
gioa, Iallae, q.105, a.l, as most rePlesentative of what 
st. Thomas thought the best form of rule to be. 9 This re-
sponse of St. Thomas to the question, "Whether the Old Law 
made fitting disposition with regard to rulers," might well 
be oalled the oommon plaoe in this matter. The body of the 
artiole reads as follOWS: 
I answer that in the matter of 
--.-................ --............. 
~ •••• manifestum est quod non multum distant." Pol., IV, 7. 
o P§l., IV, 10. ,.. 
7 lid. 
g see-above, note 2. 
9 Cf. Demongeot, 22. oit., p.9: ·Or il est un texte o~, de 
l'avis de tous, saint Thomas a exprime oette pensee de 
fason partioulierement preoise et oomplete, et qui par la 
rev~t une importanoe toute speoiale pour l'intelligence de , 
la question eto.'; Gilson, Le Thomisme, p.~7: "Oe re-
gime ne res semble guere aux monarohies absolues et fondees 
sur le droit du sang qui se sont parfois reolamees de 
ltautoritede saint Thomas dlAquin. Pour le deorire, 
saint Thomas se tourne simplement vers ltAnoien Testament. 
Il tire sa politique de ltEor.1ture et aussi dlAristote, 
en un texte que nous devons oiter tout entier oomme un 
exemple typique de oes dootrines dont, a lien oroire, 
saint Thomas emprunte tout, et qui ntappartiennent oepen-
dant quia lui."; Alexander Passerin d'Entreves: The 
Mediae1val Oontribution to Poli tioal Thought: Thomas 
Aguinas, Karsilius of Padua, Richard Hooker (Oxford, 1939), 
p.13g; J. Donat, S.J.: Ethioa Specialis (Innsbruck, 1927), 
p. 165, etc. 
the disposition of rulers in 
some state or people, two things 
must be oonsidered. One of these 
is that everybody have a part in 
the ruling; for by this peaoe is 
preserved among the people and 
all like, and all abide by, suoh 
a set-up, as it is said. The 
other thing to be loo~ed to is 
the form of rule or the disposi-
tion of powers. Of this there 
are different kinds, as the Phil-
osopher tells us. Th~prinoipal 
forms are monarohy, i~whioh one 
man holds rule by reason of his 
virtue; aristooraoy, that is the 
rule of nobles, in whioh some few 
men hold the power of rule by 
reason of their virtue. Whenoe 
the best disposition of rulers 
in some state or realm is that 
in whioh one man is made ohief 
by reason of his virtue and he 
presides over all; under him there 
are some men who hold the power of 
rule by reason'of their virtue; 
and still suoh a power of rule 
pertains to all, both beoause the 
rulers oan be ohosen from all and 
beoause the rulers are eleoted by 
all. But suoh is every form of 
rule well oomposed of monarohy, 
inasmuoh as one presides; of aris-
tooraoy, inasmuoh as many hold the 
power of rule by reason of their 
virtue; and of demooraoy, inasmuoh 
as the rulers oan be seleoted from 
the people and the eleotion of 
rulers pertains to the people. 
And this is what was set up by 
divine law: Jor Koses and his 
successors govern the people, rul-
ing alone as it were over all --
this is a kind of monarohy. Seven-
ty-two elders were eleoted for 
their virtue; for it is said in 
Deut. I, verse 15: ~! took ~ 
of your tribes ~ wise ~ honor-
able, and I appOinted them rulers, 
.' 
, 
and this was aristocratic. But .' 
it was democratic that they were 
elected from all the people; for 
it is said in Exod. XVII1, 21: 
Provide out of all the people 
able ~,etc. Whence it is evi-
dent that the disposition of rul-
ers which the Law o4deined was 
best. 10 • "7 
What shall we make of this passage? The first thing to 
be established, it would seem, is what St. Thomas is doing 
here. To us it seems clear that he is engaged in a theologi-
~ consideration. Specifically, he is engaged in the or-
dinary theological task of seeking reasons of appropriateness 
(rationes convenientiae). 11 This process involves seeking 
to provide explanations of the fittingness of divine action. 
In most cases this is done by bringing to bear what theology 
knows of God on the particular instance under discussion. 
Ordinarily, therefore, the gathering of reasons of appropri- ,.. 
ateness involves the exercise of the theological habit purely 
and simply. As such, the procedure would not be of direct 
.... -......... ~ ...... ----.. -.. 
10 i.!., IaIIae, q.105, a.l. The only variant reading noted 
in the Leonine edition which would seem to have any pos-
sible influence on the interpretation is the Editio Romana 
(likewise in the Codex Cameracensis) reading: 'Talis est 
enim optima politia" for "Talis vero est omnis politla. M 
11 Such would seem to be the import of the "Utrum convenien-
terM of the question of the article. (All four articles 
are concerned with questions of this type.) In the light 
of this, Demongeotts paraphrase of the question: "lsi 
llorganisation gouvernementale donn6e aux Hebreux par la 
loi divine etait bien la mell1eure,11I (~. £!l., p.9) 
would seem a little forced. 
philosophioal interest. 
Sometimes it happens, however, that what is under dis-
oussion is a matter whioh is "supernatural in mode only." 
In other words, the agent is God, but the aotion is not suoh 
in oonoept as to require God as agJnl. In suoh a oase the 
theologian makes an instrumental use of philosophioal truth 12 
in his searoh for some, at least, of.the reasons of appro-
priateness. This gives the philosopher an area in a question 
of this type wherein he may legitimately philosophize. 
Sinoe the text whioh we have cited is, in our view, of 
the type just desoribed, we may press further our oonsidera" 
tion of how the theologian works in suoh a situation. It 
would seem that the theologian tries to get as olose to the 
oonditions of the oase he is studying as possible. In a 
sense, he tries to put himself insofar as he possibly oan in 
~ 
God's position. His effort will be to muster the best rea-
sons he oan in the hope that these will provide him with some 
inkling of "what God had in mind" in operating as He did. 
This would seem to be involved in the attempt to disoover how 
~--------------
12 "The light of faith is different in kind from that ot 
pure reason. But that does not prevent theology from 
taking up in an instrumental way the knowledge provided 
by reason (whioh thereupon oeases to be the soienoe of 
pure reason) into a form of knowledge whioh tends to 
resolve itself into the soienoe of the blessed." 
J. Karitain, Soienoe ~ Wisdom, p. 203. 
, 
God's disposition of the matter was fitting. To put tc 
another way: In such a procedure we would seem to have a 
"case study", whioh is to say, the very type 13 'of what 
Yaritain calls practically-practical knowledge. 
NOW, as we see it, the text we9 flave under discussion 
involves practically-practical knowing as much as any case 
about Oletus and Rufina ever did. 
, 
If. so, the text will show 
• 
this chiefly by the way it is impregnated with consideration 
of the conditions of the case. l~ It is our belief that the 
whole article demands this interpretation. 
In the first place, St. Thomas is aware of the histori-
cal period (under the Law 15) in which this form of regimen 
was set up. 16 This is clear from the fact that the form 
---------------
1
13 Of. above, Ohapter II, note 23. 
4 "[Le savoir pratiquement-pratique] est beaucoup parti- ~ 
cu1arisee que la theologie morale ou 1 t ethique, ••• el1e 
considere le detail des cas •••• J. Yaritain, Les degres 
du savoir, p.62~. ---
15 Of. his division of human history into three periods: 
ante legem; sub lege; sub gratia. S.T., IIallae, q.17~, 
a.6. 
16 This is by no means a negligible consideration in view 
of st. Thomas's doctrine on the conditions that prevailed 
under the Law. Of. particularly the principle which he 
is constantly invoking in interpreting Genesis: -Kofses 
rudi populo loquebatur, quorum imbeci11itati condescen-
dens, i1la solum eis proposuit quae manifeste sensui a~­
parent." S.!., la, q.6g, a.3. See also, ~.!., la, q.6l, 
a.1, ad lum, etc. P. Rousse10t, S.J., gives an excellent 
summary of St. Thomas's doctrine on the conditions under 
the Law in Ltlntel1ectua1isme de saint Thomas (Paris, 
Beauchesne, 1924), pp. 235 et seq. 
, 
. chosen was not monarchy, which for st. Thomas would have been 
the form of governance if the Fall had not taken place. 17 He 
has not forgotten or abjured his teaching elsewhere that mon-
archy is the best form of government. This is evident from 
his words in the second objection: ~ •••• the best ordering of 
any state or people is that it should be governed by a·king. Mlg 
A monarchy was not set up precisely because of the ten-
• dency of the particular people involved to become tyrants: 
••• the Israelites were parti-
cularly cruel and prone to 
avarice; through these vices 
especially do men fall into 
tyranny. 19 
The peculiar danger of revolts involved is evident 
throughout the article. In the beginning of the body of the 
article, St. Thomas says in effeot that in oonsidering the 
politioal set-up of some state or people two things must be 
~ 
taken into account, viz., the end of the regimen (pax populi) 
and the means to that end (species regiminis vel ordinatio 
principatuum). But, concerning the end of the .regimen, he 
adds what, in our interpretation, is already the considera-
tion of a type of condition, viz., a people difficult to 
control; for he says: 
--~------------
17 See above, Ohapter III, note ~O. 
19 Loc. cit.; he confirms this in the reply. Of. also obj.5. 
19 Loc. £11.,. ad 2um. 
, 
One of these is that eveverybody .' 
have a part in the rulf_ing; for 
by this peaoe is prese~erved among 
the people and all like=e, and all 
abide by, suoh a set-ugap, as it 
is said. 20 
The immediate oontext abounds with r~t~ferenoes to the propen-
...... 
sity of the Israelites to revolt. In a the reply to the seoond 
objeotion, St. Thomas tells of God's 0 oonoession to the peo-
ple's demand for a king (hitherto witHwtheld beoause of t~e 
danger of tyranny, as already noted): 
••• but later, and as : it were 
indignantly, He oonoede.ed a king 
at the request of the D people, 
as is olear from what H He said 
to Samuel: For they hanave not 
rejeoted thee, but ~, • that I 
should BQ! reign ~! them. 
[I Kings, VIII, 7] 2:~1 
In the third objeotion St. Thomas tel:ils us that the later 
division of the kingdom, whioh Ahias • was ordered to make, 22 
,.. 
20 
21 
22 
was visited upon that I people in 
punishment for their m~ny dis-
sensions, espeoially tluhose whioh 
they initiated against u David the just •••• 
The referenoe is to Aristotle, Po:olitios, II, 9, l270b 19 
et seq., where it is a question o:of the Jphoralty feature 
of the Laoedaemonian oonstitutiono and its usefulness· in 
maintaining oontentment among the ~ people. See above, 
Chapter III, notes 52, 5" and 56.0. 
Cf. 1:2.2.. oit., ad 5um: ••• unde e hoo dioebat Samuel ad 
terrendum eos, ne regem peterent; ; sequitur enim: loluit 
autem audire populus vooem Samuel:~is I Reg., VIII,19 .H 
III Reg., XI. 
, 
The oligarchical principle, which is absent from the mixed 
regime as presented in this article, seems to have been ad-
visedly excluded to remove a cause of revolt. 23 
The foregoing considerations seem to make it clear that 
. 
as st. Thomas wrote this article hi Bad the special condi-
tions of the Israelite people very vividly in view. There 
is another consideration, a verbal o~e, which is at least 
persuasive of the particularity of the viewpoint taken. This 
is the use of "some" in the two following phrases in the body 
of the article: 
I answer that in the matter of 
the disposition of rulers in 
some state or people, two things 
must be considered •••• Whence 
the best disposition of rulers 
in some state or realm ••• 
We realize, of course, that nothing certain can be argued 
from this usage. It does, however, favor our interpretation~ 
in the sense that an "all" or Hevery· here would embarrass it. 
Since, in effect, we have here the study of a particular 
case, the considerations are for us on the practically-
23 Cf., loc. £!i., ad ~um: H ••• et praecipue cum Dominus 
prohiberet etiam in lege ne superabundarent [scl. prin-
cipes] divitiis, aut magnifico apparatu; tum quia non 
erat facile quin ex his in superbiam et tyrann1dem 
erigerentur; tum etiam quia si principes non erant 
multum divites, et erat laboriosus princ1patus, non 
multum affectabatur a popularibuSj et sic tollebatur 
seditionis materia. H Cf. also, ad 2um: " ••. et ad 
avaritiam proni." 
practical level. What may therefore be concluded? Tkat the 
considerations retain some universality is taken for granted 
in the theory of practically-practical knowing. ·24 The ques-
tion is: To what extent may we apply St. Thomas's consider-
ations in this article? In our in~e~pretation it comes to 
this: In the first part of the body of the article, where 
he is bringing considerations from tje speculatively-practical 
level to bear on his problem ("Whence the best disposition 
of rulers etc." "But such is every [ale optima 25J form of 
rule well composed etc."), the "best" is to be understood as 
"best in view of oonditions." 26 In this sense the partiou-
lar form of a mixed regime, composed of monarchy, aristocraoy 
and demoora.oy as elements, will be best wherever the ciroum-
stances require and allow this oombination. In the last 
sentence of the body of the artiole -- "Whenoe it is evident~ 
that the disposition of rulers whioh the Law ordained was 
best" -- the "best" is to be taken with the qual1f1oation 
"in view of the particular oiroumstanoes obtaining among the 
25 
26 
"[Le savoir prat1quement pratiqu~ ctest encore une sci-
ence, parce que, si elle est beaucoup plus particularisee 
que ;a theolog1e morale ou llethique, si elle considere 
Ie detail des cas, c'est encore cependant en brassant, 
comme son objet propre, de l'universel et des raisons 
dtetre. u J. Maritain, Les degres du savoir, p.624. Cf., 
also, p.S92. 
As we have noted above in note 10, the reading is doubt-
ful. 
See above, Chapter III, notes 1 and 2. 
, 
people under the Law." Even here, of oourse, there i~an 
element of universality left: A similar set-up would be 
"best" wherever and insofar as these oiroumstances were ap-
proximated. 27 
---~----------~ 
27 Before we pass to the final chapter, it seems in order to 
give a brief consideration to two interpretations of the 
locus communis (IIallae, q.105, a~l) ;which differ from our 
own. The first of these is that of Etienne Gilson, Le 
Thomisme, Ve ad., pp.~53 et seq. For Gilson, as we nave 
already noted (see above, Chapter I, note 9), this article 
is to be taken as a kind of explanation by st. Thomas of 
what he means by monarchy. It seems clear, however, from 
objection 2 and its reply, that the Divine ordination did 
not set up a regnum in the beginning because of the ten-
dencY,of the Israelites to tyranny. Gilson cites: "Est 
etiam aliquod regimen ex istis commixtum, quod est opti-
mum" from q.95, a.~. He then identifies this mixed form 
with the one described in q.105, a.l: "11 est certain 
, q~ le regimen oommixtum du texte precedent est celui que 
decrit Sum. theol., IalIae, 105, 1, ad Resp. On lit, en 
effet, dans oe dernier texte: 'Talis enim est optima 
politia, bene commixta t " (Q2. £it., p.~57, notes 2 and 3). 
But is this identification certain? In the text from q.9~ 
a.~, the antecedent of istis includes regnum, aristocra-
tia, oligarohia, and democrati& (omitting tyrannioum). 
In q.l05, a.l, the oligarchic element is omitted from the 
mixed, seemingly on purpose (see above, note 23). For 
oligarchy as an element of the mixed form, see above, Ohap-
ter III, note 55, and above, this chapter, notes ~, 5, and 
6. Further, Gilson says: III slagit ioi de l'Anoienne 
Loi, mais n'oublions pas que saint Thomas y voit Ie type 
meme dtune optima politia. Voir Ie Sed contra: 'Ergo per 
legem populus fuit circa principes bene institutus" (Q2. 
oit., p.~59, note 3). In the sense of type of best form 
~government in that it exhibits the best adaptation to 
the ciroumstances, we could conoede this. Suoh, however, 
does not seem to be Gilson's meaning; of. " ••• Ie regime 
politique institue selon la loi de Dieu est oertainement 
le Meilleur de tous" (2£. cit., p.~7, note 3). -- Demon-
geot gives a succinot summary of his interpretation in Q2. 
£!i., pp. 11-13· His points together with our oriticisms 
f 
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It now remains for us to consider the last of th~'levels 
of practical knowing, namely, the prudential. This will be 
the burden of the next chapter • 
.. --------------
..... 
are as follows: , 
"10 ) II aborde la question a propos d'un cas particu-
lier: celui des H6breux. Mais aussitot il s'en ecarte et, 
pour resoudre ce cas particulier, stel~ve a une theorie 
g~nerale. La structure m~me de 1 t article 1e montre: Ie 
titre pose la question pour les H~reux, mais Ie corps de 
ltarticle ne contient pas la moindre consideration a eux 
particuliere dans la description du regime mixte, et il 
nten fait qulapres coup l'application a leur constitution. 
C'est donc bien en philosophe, non en legis1ateur, que 
saint Thomas traite Ie probleme, et Ie regime mixte n'est 
pas seulement 1e meilleur r~ime souhaitab1e pour les 
Hebreux, mais Ie meilleur· regime en g~nera1;" -- Our 
view of this will be clear from our discussion in the text. 
It might be pointed out, however, that in the solution of 
any case, it is usual to prefix the principles according 
to which the solution will be made, and that the principles 
themselves are selected because they apply in casu. 
H20 ) mais non d'une superiorite d'ordre-purement 
speculatif. Oar il ne borne pas a etudier en elle-meme 
et en pur metaphysicien la notion de regime politique. II 
l'6tudie concretement, il tient compte des conditions gen* 
erales des cites humaines, comme Ie montre des la premi~re 
lecture notre texte, notamment: per hoc ~ conservatur 
pax populi, et omnes talem ordinationem amant et custo-
diunt. C'est done Ie meilleur regime ~ fait, pratigue-
~;" -- We have already stated earlier that the specu-
1ati ve study of "Ie meilleur re'gime poli tique" does not f 
seem to have much meaning (see above, Chapter I, note 17). 
For St. Thomas, political questions are questions in the 
practical order of knowing (see above, Chapter III, notes 
I and 2). As should by now be clear, our proposal is to 
eliminate the so-called "speculative" consideration, -to 
put the whole discussion within the practical order of 
knowing, and to distinguish the different levels at which 
the question is considered along the line that leads down 
to the prudential. 
"30 ) i1 est manifeste que l'intention de saint Thomas 
est d'et~blir que la cons~itution donnee aux Hebreux etait 
la plus digne dt~tre donnee par Dieu lUi-merne: etc." This 
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is true. 
"40) enfin et surtout i1 faut tenir compte de ce que, 
la Bible etant un livre inspire, tout ce qutelle contient 
a une valeur exemplaire. Pour un chr6tien comme saint 
Thomas, Ie seul fait qutune constitution est inscrite dans 
la Bible la recommande dtune m~~ere ~minente au philoso-
phe politique." Our view of this will be clear from the 
text. -- To complete Demongeotts interpretation, we can 
add his conclusion: "En un mot, Ie regime mixte [as des-
cribed in Iallae, q.105, a.l] est aux yeux de saint Thomas 
Ie regime mod~le· (Q£. cit., p.l~). 
.' 
OHAPTER V 
PRUDENOE: THE END OF THE LINE 
.. 4, 
st. Thomas was seemingly not much concerned with the 
foundation of new states as such and the selection of the 
forms of government for them. So fai as we are aware, he 
nowhere explicitly says who would exercise the choice in such 
a case. It would, of course, be a mistake to associate with 
him the problem that was to come to the fore in the days of 
Bellarmine and Suarez; 1 as Mueller remarks, efforts to read 
the Vertragstheorie into Aquinas have not as yet been suc-
cessful. 2 
Since the choice of form of rule is a matter concerning 
the common good, it would seem that this decision will be 
made by the whole multitude or by him who, by one title or 
another, is charged with their care, for 
To order ••• something to the 
common good pertains either 
to the whole multitude or to 
someone who takes the place 
of the whole multitude. 3 
1 Of. James Brown Scott, Oatholic Sources of American Democ-
racy, (Ohicago, National Oatholic Alumnirederation, 1937). 
2 Mueller,~. cit., pp. 7-10. 
3 ~.!., IaIIae, q.90, a.3. It is here a question of law. 
the ~ gerens is "persona publica, quae totius multitu-
dinis curam habet." (idem.) 
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st. Thomas does not show us the multitude setti~'up a 
form of government, but he does present them as at work on 
a related matter, as doing something related to the common 
good. This is their "making", abolishing and interpreting 
. 
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of law by means of custom. ~ This geiample is instructive and 
pertinent; it will repay us to give it a brief consideration. 
In the first place, laws are no\abrupt1y to be changed: 
••• those things which belong 
to art have their efficacy from 
reason alone; and hence wherever 
it happens that there is oppor-
tunity for their betterment, that 
whioh was previously in force is 
to be changed. But laws have 
their greatest foroe from oustdm 
••• and they are therefore not 
lightly to be changed. 5 
But progress in the law is not exo1uded: 
human ••• law derives from the 
will of man regulated by reason. 
But as the reason and will of 
man in things to be done are 
manifested in words, so also 
are they manifested in deed. 
For eaoh person seems to choose 
as a good that whioh he carries 
out in doing. But it is evident 
that a law can be changed and 
likewise interpreted by words, 
insofar as these manifest an in-
terior ohange and conoept of the 
human reason. Henoe it is also 
4 M ••• consuetudo et habet vim legis, et legem abolet, et 
est legum 1nterpretatrix." S.T., Iallae, q.97, a.3. 
5 ~.1., IaIlae, q.97, a.2, ad 1um. 
f 
possible by deeds, especially .' 
the multiplication of deeds 
which constitute a custom, to 
change or interpret a law and 
even to establish something 
having the force of law; inas-
much as these exterior multi-
plied acts most effeotively 
declare the interior ohange 
of the will and the concepts 
of reason. For when something 
is done repeatedly, it seem-
ingly proceeds from a .delib-
erate judgment of the "'reason ••• 6 
What interests us in this example is that that which ulti-
mately decides what is for the common good is not the law 
but the socially exercised prudential judgment of the people. 
And this brings us to the central point towards which our 
whole thesis has been tending. 
Whoever makes the choice of the form of government --
the whole multitude, a group, or a person -- will have to 
act 
6 
7 
in accordance with reason. 7 For to establish a state ... 
s.~., IaIIae, q.97, ~3. Of. Rousselot, 2E. £!i., p.239: 
Tlous avone distingu$, dans l'individu, des jugements in-
times, fonciers et vitaux, d'avec les propositions qui for-
ment oomme la peripherie verbale de la vie intelleotuelle; 
on se rappelle l'exemple de llhomme ivre: tetsi ore profer-
at hoo non esse faoiendum, tamen interius hoo animo sentit 
quod sit faoiendum. t [la2ae, q.77 a.2 ad 5J. Il '1 a, dans 
la oonscienoe des peuples, un phenomene exaotement sem-
blable. La ooutume ~ contre la loi, paree autelle est 
ltexpression d'un jugement plus refleohi et plus profond." 
Of. the remarkable text in De veritate, q.17, a.5, ad ~um: 
"Subditus non habet judicare de praeoepto praelati, sed de 
impletione praecepti, quae ad ipsum spectate Unusqu~sque 
enim tenetur actus suos examinare ad soientiam quam a Deo 
habet, sive sit naturalis, sive acquisita, sive infusa: om-
nis enim homo debet secundum rationem agere.- Of. ~., 
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is a work of the praotical reason, in fact its prinoipal 
aohievement. g low running through the whole order of practi-
oal knowing there is a line 9 whioh oonnects this knowing, 
and brings it into continuity, with prudence -- right reason 
. 
about things to be done. 10 Along\~is line we may distin-
guish, as we have seen, 11 different levels aooording as the 
oonsideration beoomes less universal;.these levels are ocou-
pied by the praotioal soiences. But when it is a question of 
an aotual ohoice here and now, the practical soiences alone 
are an insuffioient guide.12 As SCiences, they are universal; 
0., "Oonsoientia ligabit praeoepto praelati in oontrarium 
existente." 
g "Est enim oivitas principalissimum eorum quae humana ra-
tione constitui possunt." Pol., prologue. 
9 Of. De veritate, q.lg, a. 7, ad 7um: "Soientia operabilium 
ad prudentiam pertinens ••• ; IaIIae, q.66, a.5, ad lum: 
•••• unde in hoo est prudentia, seu politioa~ ministra 
sapientiae ••• ·; In ~., III, d.33, q.2,5, ad lum; d.35: 
q.l, a.3, q.2, ad 2um. On this "oonfused" usage in the 
soholastic vocabulary, see Karitain, Les degres du savoir, 
p·g9l. 
10 ~.D. de Virtutibus Oardinalibus, a.2; of. !.!., IaIIae, 
q.71, a.6. 
11 See above, Ohapter II. 
12 MOe que nous voulons seu1ement retenir ioi, otest que 
oette philosophie pratique ne suffit pas a reg1er l'aotion 
El1e sait dtune mani~re enoore theorique, speculative, ex-
plicative, des choses qui son non pas seulement a exp1i-
quer, mais a faire. Elle assemble en ~n ~steme soiehtifi-
que toutes 1es c~nnaissances propres areg1er de ~ 
l'action, ctest-a-dire toutes 1e regulations de l'action 
qui se decouvrent a l'inte11ect adaptant a l'ueage pra-
tique un outi11age, un mode de discernement du vrai encore 
typiquement specu1atif. Le philosophe 1e plus averti et 
1e plus oompetent dans lee matieres de llethique peut se 
trouver deconcerte devant 1e plus petit acte a poser et 
A ' il peut mener lui-meme une vie immora1e." J.Maritain, Les 
........ 
, 
in the case in which the choioe is to be made the things to 
.' be considered are contingent partioulars. And it belongs to 
prudence "rightly to judge concerning the human goOd in single 
things to be done." 13 To prudence it belongs to make the 
applioation of right reason to the w~r to be done. l~ 
The possible objeotion that prudence has to do only with 
the rule of one's self is forestalled: 
'. [This would b~ contradictory to 
right reason, whioh judges that 
the common good is better than 
the good of one. Therefore, be-
cause it pertains to prudence 
rightly to oounsel, judge and 
command in those things by which 
one arrives at the due end, it 
is evident that prudence regards 
not only the private good of one 
man but also the common good of 
the multitude. 15 
This species of prudenoe is called political. 16 
At the conorete level of an aotua1 situation the choice ~ 
of the best form of government, therefore, will be guided by 
degr{s du savoir, pp. 620-621. 
13 "Oportet quod ratio praotioa perficiatur aliquo habitu ad 
hoc quod recte dijudicet de bono humano secundum singula 
agenda. Et haec virtus dicitur prudentia." De virtutibus 
in oommuni, a.6. "Prudentia ino1udit cognitionem et uni-
versalium et singu1arium operabilium ad quae prudens.uni-
versa1ia principia app1icat." i.l., IIallae, q.~7, a.15. 
l~ "Ad prudentiam ••• pertinet ••• applicatio rectae rationis 
ad opus ••. " S.T., IIallae, q.~7, a.4. 
15 S.T., IIallae, q747, a.10. 
10 T •.. dioitur autem politica secundum ordinem ad bonum 
commune." i.l., IIallae, q.~7, a.ll. 
f 
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the prudential jUdgment. At this level St. Thomas does not 
give us any statement as to which is the best form. Nor can 
we expect any such statement. This is clear if we bear in 
mind the fact that the prudential judgment is incommunica-
. 
ble. 17. As O'Neil says: 
. ~ 
It is the very incommunicability 
of prudence which puts it beyond 
the competence of the~ost learned 
and devoted teachers. The most 
inspiring lecturer cannot impart 
it, and the most carefully wrought 
book cannot contain it. ror pru-
dence is a man's very precious 
possession, his own and incommun-
ioable wisdom. Koral philosophy 
may be learned, moral sciences 
may be taught. Prudence must be 
lived. 19 
And thus, at the prudential level the question of the best 
form 'of government has to be left open, to be decided in 
17 "Those very characteristios which elevate prudence to 
the dignity of wisdom make it an incommunicable wisdom. 
Human operation in .the temporal order is the human per-
son in his ultimate fulfillment: in my act of union 
with good I am most fully myself; but my aot is my own 
and no other's act can be mine. And as I am myself in-
oommunicable so is the rational perfection of my aot 
incommunioable. For only the human individual can re-
solve the last doubt that calls for counsel; the human 
individual has only his own native ability and expe~­
ience to sharpen his intuition of the practical situa-
tion; only the human individual himself oan issue the 
ultimate moral precept, for that command is beard in 
that inner realm, wherein, under God, he alone is mas-
ter." Oharles J. O'Neil, Prudence, The Incommunicable 
Wisdom, 1n Essays in Thomism (New York, Sheed and Ward, 
1942), pp. 203-204. 
19 Ibid., p.204. 
each instance in view of the concrete contingencies of' the 
given situation. 
With our descent to the prudential judgment our hypo-
thesis as to the framework within which St. Thomas treats 
. 
.. 4; 
the question of the best form of government is complete. We 
believe that it fulfills the requirements of a good hypothe-
sis, namely, that "it explains in a ~onsistent fashion all 
the facts which it was assumed to account for." 19 That 
hypothesis, together with oollocations of the doctrine to 
the corresponding levels, is as follows: 
at.Thomas treats the question of the best form of gov-
ernment wholly within the order of practical knowing. 
At what we have identified as the top-level of this 
order, his teaching is that monarohy is the best form of 
government. This is the absolute oonsideration at the spec-~ 
ulatively-practioal level of the order of practical knowing. 
At a lower level of the speculatively-practioal division 
his decision is in favor of some form of mixed regime. At 
this lower level oonsideration of the problem is made with 
conditions in view, i.e., possible diffioulties of realiza-
tion are taken into account in a general way. 
In the Summa Theologica, I&IIae, q.105, a.l, it is a 
-------~-------
19 Carolus Friok, B.J., Logioa, ed. 5a, (Friburgi Brisgoviae, 
Herder, 1919), p.9l. 
question of practioally-praotioal knowing. st. 'l'homaa'ts 
teaohing here is that the partioular oombination of simple 
forms of government instituted by God for the Jewish people 
was best in view of the oiroumstanoes • 
. 
;, .. ; At the level of oonorete ohoioe the best form of gov-
59 
ernment is to be determined by prudenoe in the sense of the 
virtue of praotioal wisdom. In the last analysis, therefore, 
the problem of the best form of government oan only be ans-
wered by a ·prudential" judgment. 
L. D. S. 
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